Although this scene is from a motion picture comedy, its depiction of a parole release hearing is not far from the mark. Conducting as many as 135 hearings a day, 3 parole board members have few opportunities to be thorough. More ominously, because of their low profile in the criminal justice system, parole board members have few checks on their authority. The results can be far from comedic. On numerous occasions, parole board members, through deliberate or reckless action, have violated the constitutional rights of prisoners and members of society.
The violations of prisoners' constitutional rights have occurred primarily in two settings. The first is the parole revocation hearing, where a parolee, arrested and reimprisoned for an alleged parole violation, is allowed to hear and contest the charges against him. In Morrissey v. [Vol. 87:241 Brewer, 4 the Supreme Court held that a parolee has a right to procedural due process at these hearings. Yet, for over a decade, allegations of violations of prisoners' Morrissey rights by parole board members have continued. Alleged procedural due process violations have included conspiracy to fabricate charges against the parolee, 5 exclusion of a prisoner's attorney, denial of his right to confront hostile witnesses, denial of the right to a speedy hearing, 6 and even complete denial of a revocation hearing. 7 The second setting for the violation of prisoners' rights is the parole release hearing. In release hearings, the Supreme Court has declared that prisoners' rights are not guaranteed by Morrissey, but depend upon the expectations created by state stat· utes. 8 Finally, it is possible that parole board members may violate the constitutional rights of citizens by recklessly paroling highly dangerous prisoners. Such paroles may lead to the serious injury or death of innocent members of the public. 9 In theory at least, all victims suffering constitutional violations at the hands of state officials have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 . 10 The language of section 1983 seems to permit no exception from its sweep. Likewise, the legislative history of section 1983 11 contains no evidence that Congress intended any exception whatsoever.1 2 4. 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972 text. However, a thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
11. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (187J) (first enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
12. The Act's avowed purpose, to enforce the fourteenth amendment, was a response to a
To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need demonstrate only that she was deprived of a constitutional right by a state official acting under "color" of state law. 13 However, since 1951, the Supreme Court has carved out numerous exceptions to the coverage of section 1983 by giving certain governmental actors official immunity from suit. Today judges, 14 police officers, 15 prosecutors, 16 governors, 17 cabinet members, 18 and presidents of the United States 19 have been accorded either absolute or qualified immunity. Absolute, or quasi-judicial, immunity means exactly that. When the doctrine applies, it is not possible to maintain a personal damage suit against the government official for injuries sustained as a result of her official conduct, no matter how extensive or egregious the constitutional injury. If absolute immunity applies, the plaintiff may seek only injunctive relief under section 1983 20 or criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 242. 2 1 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, exposes officials to damages liability only if they violate a "clearly established" constitutional right. This objective standard, established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 22 is a radical departure from the rule in previous decisions requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with malicious intent. 23 The period of lawlessness in the southern states marked by the toleration of acts of violence by state and local governments against certain classes of the citizenry. Harlow Court abandoned this rule because it was convinced that, given the difficulty of defining the relevant evidence, an inquiry into the defendant's subjective state of mind would require intensive discovery -including numerous depositions of the defendant and colleagues -and full-scale trials. To minimize the social costs associated with such disruption, the Court felt compelled to limit official liability to cases where the reasonableness of official conduct could be determined objectively and unobtrusively. 2 4 Although the legal standards distinguishing the two levels of immunity have been refined, it remains unclear which level of immunity state parole board members should enjoy. 31 This Note argues that neither the majority nor the minority approach is realistic. A thorough examination of the parole process and section 1983 litigation will show that a third approach is more appropriate -that parole board members are entitled only to qualified· immunity for all actions taken within the scope of their official duties. Part I argues that parole board members should not enjoy absolute, quasi-judicial immunity because the parole board decisionmaking process is not "functionally comparable" 32 to judic~al decisionmaking. The differences in procedure, political accountability, training, and background lead to two very different systems. Part II shows that adopting qualified immunity will also improve the parole decisionmakv. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1984) (parole revocation and related actions are "part and parcel of the decision process" and thereby enjoy absolute' immunity).
The First This Note does not separately address the practical difficulties that the minority approach may raise because, with respect to so-called "adjudicatory" actions of parole board members, that approach subscribes to the majority view that board members are similar to judges and require absolute immunity in order to preserve their independent judgment. Thus, this Note's frontal attack on the majority view should be understood as a critique of the "adjudicatory function" aspect of the minority approach as well.
32. For a complete definition of this term see Part I.A infra.
[Vol. 87:241 ing process by fostering disincentives for unconstitutional conduct. Parole board members themselves would be more careful to respect well-established constitutional rights, and state government would be more likely to implement better selection, training, and risk-management procedures. Finally, Part III illustrates that limiting the immunity of parole board members is necessary to provide both monetary and symbolic relief to victims of unconstitutional conduct. Other forms of relief, such as habeas corpus, are inadequate to protect prisoners and parolees, and completely unavailable to victims. With no effective forms of relief, section 1983 rings hollow. But if parole board members are given only qualified immunity from suit, then section 1983 will serve the cause for which it was enacted -to compensate those whose constitutional rights have been violated. The road to this vindication of section 1983 begins with an exploration of the differences between parole boards and courts and the great differences between the players themselves: parole board members and judges.
I. PAROLE BOARDS AND THE "FUNCTIONAL" APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 IMMUNITY Judges are given immunity from suit so that they will make impartial decisions uninfluenced by the possibility of personal liability. The basic assumption behind the majority and minority approaches to parole board member immunity is that parole board officials so closely resemble judges that at least some of their official conduct should be cloaked with absolute, quasi-judicial immunity, so that they too may be impartial decisionmakers. By first describing immunity doctrine and then comparing parole board members with judges, this Part will demonstrate that this fundamental assumption is groundless for two reasons. First, the parole process is far more bureaucratic than adjudicatory. Prisoners, if not wholly excluded from participation, play a minimal role in the system. Second, parole board members lack the political insularity and qualifications of judges. Removable at the governor's will, board members are political animals and often behave accordingly.
A. The Test in Butz v. Economou
The Supreme Court has developed two lines of analysis in determining the appropriate level of official immunity. The first considers the status of the office over the course of Anglo-American legal history. For example, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 33 the Supreme Court reasoned that the common law tradition of absolute immunity for legislators made it highly unlikely that the drafters of section 1983 could have intended to do away with that tradition without an express 33. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). declaration of that intent. 34 Likewise, in Pierson v. Ray, 35 the Court accorded absolute immunity to judges because "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law" than judicial immunity. 36 Because this analysis is inapplicable to officials in positions of recent vintage, the Court developed a second line of analysis involving explicit policy considerations. Specifically, the Court began to weigh the private interests of compensation for and deterrence of constitutional wrongs against the public interest in preserving the independent judgment of state officials. 37 In Butz v. Economou, 38 the Supreme Court presented this analysis in its most refined and formulaic mode and established the prevailing approach to the question of parole board immunity.
Butz v. Economou involved a suit by a commodity futures merchant alleging that several officials in the U.S. Department of Agriculture had deprived him of his constitutional rights to free speech and procedural due process. The complaint stated that, in response to "sharply critical" remarks the plaintiff made, several departmental of-, ficials -including the Secretary of Agriculture, the assistant secretary, the chief hearing examiner and the judicial officer of the department -initiated administrative proceedings to revoke his registration as a futures merchant. Addressing the issue of the appropriate level of immunity for federal executive officials, the Butz Court stated that qualified immunity was the general rule. 39 A blanket rule of absolute immunity for executive officials would, the Court reasoned, effectively subordinate the constitutional interests of victims to the interests of those who caused the injuries. 40 general rule of qualified immunity, the Court noted that "there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability." 41 According to the Court, the nature of the official's function, rather than her particular location within the government, was the relevant consideration. For example, judges and those "functionally comparable" to them, such as grand jurors and prosecutors, required absolute immunity in order that they may undertake their duties free of "harassment or intimidation." 42 The Supreme Court also pointed out that the safeguards in the judicial process reduce the need for a private damages action as a means to deter unconstitutional conduct. The Court found several safeguards important: (1) the insulation of the judge from political influence, (2) the importance of precedent to judges resolving controversies, (3) the adversarial nature of the judicial process, and (4) the ability to correct error on appeal. 43 In applying the functional comparability test to the Butz defendants, the Court conducted a two-part inquiry. First, the Court asked whether the defendants exercised judge-like powers and whether the administrative proceedings over which they presided were similar to cases heard by judges. Second, the Court looked for the presence of numerous safeguards against unconstitutional conduct in the agency. 44 This second prong of the functional comparability test -the existence of safeguards preventing unconstitutional conduct -appears to be the essential foundation underlying absolute immunity:
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of these men and women. We therefore hold that persons subject to these restraints and performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts. 45 Accordingly, determining which executive officials pass the functional comparability test and thus possess absolute, quasi-;judicial immunity requires courts not only to compare the officials' powers and duties to those of judges, but also to look for the existence of institu-41. 438 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added). 42. 438 U.S. at 512-13. Although credit for the "functional comparability" test is given to Butz, the term first appeared in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976), discussed at note 37 supra.
43. 438 U.S. at 512. 44. 438 U.S. at 513-14. In particular, the Court found the following safeguards present in the administrative hearing: (1) adversarial proceedings, (2) political insularity of the trier of fact, (3) the record for decision consists exclusively of the pleadings, transcripts of testimony and exhibits, (4) availability to both parties of the findings offact and law by the examiner, (5) ability of both parties to present oral or documentary evidence, (6) inability of the Hearing Examiner to discuss the controversy without first notifying the parties and offering them an opportunity to participate, and (7) availability of agency or judicial review.
45. 438 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added).
tional checks minimizing the risk of unconstitutional conduct. 46 
B. The Nature of the Parole Decisionmaking Process
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A careful examination of the various parole models employed by the states is a necessary first step in determining whether parole board members are so functionally comparable to judges that they deserve the blanket protection of absolute immunity.
The federal courts of appeals frequently discuss Butz, but devote little time and effort to investigating the nature of the parole decisionmaking process when applying it. A thorough investigation of the parole process reveals that it differs from the judicial decisionmaking process in several important respects. 47 First, parole systems vary greatly. 48 To subscribe to the notion that there is one parole system in some Platonic sense 49 is at best naive, and at worst intellectually dishonest. This diversity of systems is quite unlike the relative uniform.-ity of the judiciary. Second, the selection, treatment, and consequent behavior of parole board members is very different from that of judges. These differences give rise to the need for differences in the level of immunity for each.
The Decisionmaking Framework
The parole systems in the United States roughly fall into two basic models: the discretionary system and the mandatory release system. so In the former, the parole board has full discretion in awarding and revoking parole. In the latter, the release decision is based upon statutory formulae.st
In the discretionary system, the parole board may have to follow 47. Unfortunately, the existing case law exhibits a tendency to make sweeping generalizations about the independence and integrity of parole board members. This tendency is not unique to the lower courts. The Supreme Court has also noted, in purely conclusory language, that parole boards are relatively "neutral and detached" hearing bodies. [S]ome members of some parole departments promulgate the conditions to be imposed upon parolees, some supervise and counsel with parolees, some investigate possible violations of conditions of parole, some recommend termination of parole and others order the termination, some promulgate the standards by which parole is to be granted or withheld, some recommend the grant of parole and others order it granted. 49. The reference here is to Plato's theory of Forms, or Ideas. Specifically, it refers to the metaphysical component of that theory, which maintains that a word like " [A] criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer •.. ;formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed:
and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole. 411 U.S. at 779 (emphasis added).
One result of this relaxed standard is that otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence may be considered in parole revocation hearings. parole release or revocation proceeding is an important distinction between such hearings and judicial proceedings.
In some instances, the prisoner himself may provide information to the parole board. 56 Because most state statutes do not require a personal appearance before the board, this information is usually written. 57 This procedure stands in stark contrast to the right of the accused to be heard in a judicial proceeding. 58 The brief and informal nature of the hearing itself produces a nonadversarial atmosphere. In many cases the irimate does not make a personal appearance before the board, 59 and even when the inmate does appear, he often has little chance to do more than field questions fired at him from across the table. 60 Studies have shown that the parole board hearings tend to last only a few minutes from the time the prisoner enters the room until a preliminary determination is made. 61 Moreover, only a few jurisdictions permit an attorney to accompany the inmate; 62 and even where it is permitted, few prisoners can afford private counsel at parole hearings after incarceration for several years, so any state-created right to counsel has little meaning. 6 3 One feature of some systems is the requirement that the board provide a written record of the reasons supporting its parole decision. 64 However, review of the board's decision may be quite limited. In New York, for example, judicial review of parole board actions is unavailable if the actions are taken "in accordance with law." 65 review is permitted, a marked deference to parole boards is easy to detect. 66 In most cases, an inmate's only hope for review is the possibility that the entire parole board may review the hearing panel's actions. 67 With these details of the parole decisionmaking framework in mind, it becomes apparent that the settings for parole board and judicial decisionmaking are quite different. This dissimilarity is also reflected in the decisionmakers themselves. The following discussion points out the many differences between board members and judges: differences in political accountability, status, tenure, and qualification.
Parole Board Members
The selection and treatment of parole board members play a large role in shaping the parole process. Parole board members belong to the executive branch which, unlike the state judiciary, generally enjoys only qualified immunity. 68 Operating under the governor, parole board members are far more vulnerable to political pressures than judges. As a consequence, their approach to decisionmaking is quite different from that of judges.
The parole board members themselves are typically selected by gubernatorial appointment subject to legislative approval. 69 The term of appointment ranges from three to six years, 70 It is precisely this threat of removal that introduces the political element into the process. In Virginia, for example, members are reminded by statute that they "serve at the pleasure of the Governor." 72 In most states, the pressure is less explicit, but equally palpable. For example, California Deputy Attorney General Anthony Dicce once professed that gubernatorial pressure is felt by all parole board members, even those appointed by a previous administration:
The board is always subject to some degree of politics because board members are always appointed by the governor . . . . If you or I were on the board and wanted to get appointed again, and got an impression of how the governor felt, we might behave accordingly. 7 3
Dicce's point is well made. Because the criminal justice system involves powerful political issues, parole board members' livelihood depends on whether they are an asset or liability to the administration. 74 As a result, parole board members are prone to bend to community pressure in connection with decisions to award or deny parole to notorious criminals. Periodically, the political stature of parole boards has permitted popular opinion to effect dramatic reversals in policy. 75 The susceptibility of board members to political pressures is exac- [Vol. 87:241 erbated by their professional standing. In the first place, they do not enjoy the prestige and respect accorded to judges. In fact, over one half of the parole board members in this country are part-time employees. 76 Thus, many parole board members have two bosses -the governor and the private employer -who may have something to say about the politics of parole. By contrast, state judges, even elected ones, are insulated from such daily pressures. As one parole board member put it, "We're not judges. We don't ·have the same independence." 77 In the second place, parole board members have a stronger personal incentive to maintain the correct political line. It is unlikely that many parole board members have the educational background of judges. 78 The implications of this disparity upon relative opportunities for jobs of equal pay 79 or status (i.e., a government post) are obvious. Put frankly, board members have more to lose than judges.
Clearly, all of these factors undermine the perception that parole boards are detached hearing bodies. Unlike courts, parole boards usually have little statutory guidance in the factors which should be considered in release decisions. There are few evidentiary requirements, and procedural due process safeguards are greatly diminished. The parole board members themselves are subject to far more political pressure than judges, but at the same time, they are given almost as much authority over the lives of prisoners. Keeping these differences in mind, a more enlightened application of the functional comparability test may now be undertaken. between it and the judicial system in accordance with Butz v. Economou is in order. The earlier efforts by the courts of appeals to make such comparisons failed to include a thorough discussion of the many differences between parole board hearings and judicial proceedings discussed above. In this section, a faithful application of the functional comparability test reveals that parole board members fail to meet the Butz requirements.
Of Boards and Benches: The Wooden Approach of Sellars
Consideration of the inadequacies of the prevailing judicial approach to parole board member immunity illustrates why a new application of the functional comparability test in this context is required. The discussion in the leading case on the issue, Sellars v. Procunier, 80 leaves much unanswered.
As mentioned earlier, 81 Sellars v. Procunier has been so well received by other courts of appeals that they have opted to quote major portions of it rather than embark upon the Butz inquiry themselves. 82 Sellars involved a section 1983 action brought by an inmate against members of the California Adult Authority. 83 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied parole ~ retaliation for the plaintiff's expression of his political views, thereby violating his constitutional rights under the first, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. 84 In addressing the immunity issue, the court recognized that Butz required it not only to examine an official's location within the superstructure of the government, 85 but also to examine the official's function. Applying the first prong of the Butz test -whether the official performs an adjudicatory function -the court first stated that the "daily task" of judges and parole board members is the same: adjudication of given cases. Next, the court concluded that the two entities have the same primary duty: to deliver impartial decisions that may affect an individual's liberty. Finally, the court concluded that the risk of "constant unfounded suits" from disappointed participants was the After expressing its concern that exposure to numerous meritless lawsuits would hamper the parole process, the court applied the second prong of the Butz test. After looking for institutional safeguards against unconstitutional conduct, the court concluded that three existed: (1) parole decisions were subject to habeas corpus challenges; (2) California prisoners had a right to apply for parole and due consideration thereof; and (3) California prisoners had a right to a written statement explaining why parole was denied. 87 The Sellars court concluded that "such safeguards, especially the right to habeas corpus relief, are sufficient to protect petitioner's constitutional rights."88
Although it applied a relatively new line of analysis, the Sellars court had arrived at a conclusion reached in the Ninth Circuit a decade earlier: absolute immunity should be given to officials processing parole applications. 89 As the following discussion demonstrates, application of the two-pronged test in light of the differences between parole boards and courts yields a different result.
The Failure of Parole Boards To Satisfy the Functional Comparability Test
The flaw in Sellars is clear. The court considered basic similarities between parole board members and judges to the exclusion of all else. 90 A more complete method of comparison, one taking dissimilarities into account, demonstrates that parole board members and judges are not functionally comparable, but are, in fact, two drastically different creatures.
a. The first prong. The first prong of the functional comparability test -whether parole board members perform an "adjudicatory function"91 -requires an examination of all actions performed by parole board members, not only those resembling judicial actions. This examination reveals that there are, in fact, several significant differences in the adjudicatory functions performed by judges and parole board members.
The first difference is that parole board members are less likely to act impartially than judges. This distinction is important because an 90. Indeed, such superficial analysis brings to mind the old saw that a mouse closely resembles an elephant because both animals are gray, have disproportionately large ears, and thin tails. Such a method of comparison is obviously wooden and incomplete.
91. 438 U.S. at 514.
environment of official bias can serve as a breeding ground for unconstitutional conduct. Because one of the purposes of section 1983 is to deter such conduct, it should apply to the class of officials most likely to engage in it. 92 The primary reason that parole board members are less likely to be as impartial as judges is that they are markedly more vulnerable to political pressures. Two pressures are brought to bear on parole board members: pressure from superiors, and pressure from the public. The power and inclination of state governors to remove members for politically unpopular decisions is well documented. 93 Unlike the executive branch hearing examiners in Butz v Economou, parole board members are subject to removal by a political official rather than a neutral body such as a civil service commission. 94 In addition, because criminal corrections is a volatile public issue, parole board officials receive pressure to make decisions in accordance with public sentiment. 95 The significance of this difference between executive officials and judges has been misunderstood. For example, one commentator has suggested that the importance of this difference lies in society's expectations of official conduct. According to this view, judges are expected to be impartial, but executive officials are not because "[p]olitical influences [are] commonly known [to] permeate the executive decisionmaking process." From this premise it is argued that because there is no expectation of impartiality, victims of executive officials' conduct will feel less affronted and less anxious to file suit. Thus, the argument goes, because executive officials will be less likely targets for lawsuits, they deserve less protection from suit than judges. 96 Though seductive in its simplicity, this argument is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it rests on the dubious assumption that the primary motivation for section 1983 suits is a disappointed expectation of an official's impartiality. A more likely motivation is anger at the occurrence of what the plaintiff perceives as a wrong done her at the hands of a state official. 97 A person illegally searched and arrested by a police officer -an executive official -will not feel any less injured 92 [Vol. 87:241 or inclined to file suit because she recognizes that politics permeate the executive branch.
The argument is unpersuasive for a second reason. The implicit assumption that likelihood of civil suit is the sole criterion in determining which level of immunity officials "deserve" is equally suspicious. The test in Butz v. Economou indicates that the immunity inquiry is far more sophisticated, taking into account the existence of safeguards reducing the need for private damage actions as a means for deterring unconstitutional conduct. Such safeguards include insulation from political influence, the adversary nature of the process, and the ability to correct error on appeal. 98 The assumption is also counterfactual because it ignores the reality of executive official immunities. For example, although police officers and members of prison disciplinary boards are frequently the targets of section 1983 damages actions, they enjoy only qualified immunity. 99 Thus, the argument that executive officials require a lower level of immunity because they are less likely to be sued is neither theoretically nor empirically sound.
Another important difference between parole board members and judges is that the board members are either required or allowed to conduct investigations of parole candidates themselves. 100 Indeed, in this respect, parole board members resemble police officers or prosecutors, who enjoy only qualified immunity for investigatory conduct. 1 01 Other differences exist as well: Many parole board members are only part-time professionals, and many parole boards are subject to no edu- This bifurcated approach to prosecutor immunity -absolute immunity for case preparation and qualified immunity for investigatory conduct -would seem to support the Third Circuit's approach to parole board immunity. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra. However, the Third Circuit has never considered, much less employed, this analogy in its parole board immunity decisions.
As it turns out, this analogy is problematic. Unlike prosecutors, parole board members do more than prepare cases; they decide them. Board members on a hearing panel may be, if not completely biased, at least disinclined to challenge unsubstantiated claims made by their colleagues. Thus, the risk of tainted decisionmaking is greater in the context of parole hearings than in judicial proceedings, where the decisionmaker (judge or jury) forms its first impression during the proceeding. cational requirements whatsoever. 102 Leaving these fundamental dissimilarities aside, careful analysis reveals that the few characteristics shared by parole board members and judges are also shared by officials enjoying only qualified immunity. For example, the duty to decide highly emotional controversies in which impartiality is demanded of the decisionmaker is shared not only by parole board members and judges, but also by other public officials, such as school board members and prison disciplinary officials. The latter two officials, despite this shared characteristic, are not considered quasi-judicial and thus enjoy only qualified immunity.103 Clearly then, the requirement of impartial decisionmaking is not indicative of a quasi-judicial function.
Similarly, parole board members and judges share with other officials enjoying qualified immunity the risk of unfounded suits by dissatisfied parties. Indeed, any government official making decisions in highly volatile situations faces the risk of a "spite" suit. 104 Yet this has not been sufficient to mandate absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for all government officials. As mentioned earlier, police officers enjoy only qualified immunity from section 1983 damages actions. 105 The very features that parole board members have in common with judges are shared by other officials, but these other officials are not considered functionally comparable to judges. In light of the differences described, parole board members and judges are also not functionally comparable. , Two points in this application of the first prong of the Butz test should now be clear. First, parole board officials are by nature political animals: acting, thinking and functioning quite differently from judges. Second, the few similarities parole board members share with judges are also shared by other officials enjoying qualified immunity. To argue that nonjudicial officials are as likely to be the subjects of "spite" suits as judges is not to say that this likelihood is very high at all. Indeed, the available empirical evidence indicates that this likelihood is not at all significant. See Part II infra.
105. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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In short, parole board members fail to satisfy the first prong of the Butz test. b. The second prong. The thrust of the second prong of the Butz test -the existence of institutional safeguards from unconstitutional conduct -is obvious. Section 1983 was itself designed to deter unconstitutional conduct 106 and should apply where needed. Consideration of the nearly complete absence of three important safeguards from the parole process -political insularity of the decisionmaker, adversary proceedings, and ability to correct error upon appeal -reveals an urgent need to permit section 1983 damages as a means of deterring unconstitutional acts by parole board members.
Much has already been said about the first safeguard emphasized by the Butz Court: political insularity of the decisionmaker. 107 In light of the apparent willingness of board members to respond to both popular and gubernatorial pressure, it seems fair to say that in general, parole board members view themselves as political actors and behave accordingly . 108 A second safeguard important to this prong of the Butz testadversary proceedings -. is also conspicuously absent from the parole decisionmaking process. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that parole hearings are of a completely different cast than adversary proceedings. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court remarked upon the contrast between courtroom proceedings and parole revocation hearings:
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding [would] alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. . . . The role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discretionary" as well as factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee.
* * *
[A] criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation proceeding, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer ... ; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole. The Supreme Court has also noted that parole release hearings are of an even less adversarial nature than parole revocation hearings. 110 Thus, to characterize any sort of parole hearing as an adversary proceeding would contradict both empirical evidence and judicial characterizations of the parole process.
The third safeguard -the ability to correct error on appeal -is, if not entirely absent from the parole process, 111 largely meaningless once the constitutional injury has been inflicted.· The courts of appeals have almost invariably disposed of the second prong of the Butz test by extolling the virtues of the writ of habeas corpus as such a safeguard.112 But such analysis is deficient for two reasons. First, a writ of habeas corpus is meaningless as a safeguard to third parties. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit missed this pqint in Nelson v. Balazic, 113 where the court supported its ruling of absolute immunity for the parole board defendants in a third-party damages suit merely by citing two parole denial decisions within that circuit. 114 These decisions awarded absolute immunity to parole officials in carrying out their official duties. Purporting to apply the Butz standard, the Balazic court stated: "the extent of immunity accorded an official depends solely on the official's function. Whether claimant is an inmate appealing denial of parole or a victim of a parolee's criminal actions is irrelevant " 115 It is difficult to understand how the court could have reached this anomalous ·conclusion. The fact that habeas corpus actions provide no safeguard or remedy to third parties injured by a parolee is extremely relevant to the functional comparability test articulated in Butz. Indeed, Butz's second prong reflects the desire to ensure that citizens are protected from constitutional injury. The Balazic court skirted the issue of institutional safeguards protecting members of the public for an obvious reason: nqne exist. 116 Thus, in connection with third-party actions, the second prong of the functional comparability test is left unsatisfied. · whether a prisoner is a good parole risk represents an aspect of state prison discipline, not an adjudication of rights in an adversary proceeding." The courts' reliance upon the writ of habeas corpus as an important safeguard is deficient for a second reason -a reason relating to parolees rather than victims. While a writ of habeas corpus may be useful as a safeguard against wrongful parole denials, it fails to prevent wrongful parole revocations. For example, a writ of habeas corpus cannot prevent the practice of "Jail Therapy," an apparently common, albeit Kafkaesque, practice in which persons on probation or parole are arrested, imprisoned, and then released without a hearing.117 A writ of habeas corpus, if necessary, only secures release; it cannot guard against compensable harm a parolee may incur before release. 118 Safeguards like those found in the judicial system are conspicuously absent from the parole system. Thus, the need for the section 1983 safeguard is clear. But would fulfilling this need bring an end to vigorous decisionmaking by competent public officials? It would not. In fact, there is good reason to believe that exposure to civil liability will greatly improve the parole process.
II. THE IMPACT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ON PAROLE BOARD ACTIVITY
A second assumption behind the majority and minority approaches to parole board immunity is that, for at least some officials, absolute immunity is necessary to ensure sound decisionmaking. In particular, three concerns about the impact of civil exposure on public officials have surfaced: (1) that limited immunity would dampen vigorous decisionmaking, 1 19 (2) that public officials' valuable time would be consumed litigating meritless claims, 120 and (3) that the prospect of civil liability will scare competent persons away from those positions.121 In theory at least, these concerns appear to be compelling. 122 However, an examination of the facts demonstrates that these concerns are hardly overwhelming.
An examination of the reality of section 1983 litigation, particularly prisoner petitions, reveals that the assumptions underlying each concern about qualified immunity lack an empirical basis. Rather than hampering sound decisionmaking, qualified immunity should promote more conscientious board action.
A. The Reality of Section 1983 Litigation
At first glance, the large number of section 1983 filings, particularly those by prisoners, seems reason enough to cloak every official connected with the penal system with absolute immunity. In this decade alone, the number of state prisoner civil rights petitions has risen from about 17,000 to over 20,000 per year. 123 Commentators are fond of citing such large numbers as a preamble to a critique of damages actions for constitutional injuries. (1983) . Professor Freed argues that the threat of civil liability is bound to scare away those with the broadest career choices, whom he considers to be the most able candidates for the positions. The result of such a threat, Freed contends, will be the occupation of public offices by residual applicants, leaving governance in the hands of those most likely to do damage.
There can be little doubt that persons currently enjoying qualified immunity -such as governors, policemen, and public university presidents -would take issue with the implications of [Vol. 87:241 section 1983 actions exert upon judicial resources, 125 it would be seriously misleading to rely upon them to draw conclusions about the effect of qualified immunity upon parole board members. In the first place, filings against board members are a fraction of the annual total, with prisoners filing suits against other officials with whom they more frequently come into contact. More significantly, of that fraction, we can expect only three of ten filings ever to come to board members' attention. Most prisoner petitions are short-lived; in fact, about seventy percent of prisoner petitions are dismissed before service is ever delivered upon the defendant. 126 A federal pauper's suit statute allows judges (or judicial clerks) to prescreen and dismiss a petition "if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if [the court is] satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. " 127 Because most prisoner suits are brought in forma pauperis, 128 this screening device significantly reduces the likelihood that a parole board member will be the subject of a mere "spite" suit filed by a prisoner.
Significantly, studies tracing prisoner suits from the time of filing to final disposition also show that prisoner suits would not actually entangle parole board members in extensive discovery. For example, one national study of prisoner suits conducted over a five-year period revealed that only three pro se litigants received answers to interrogatories, and none received documents or deposition testimony from defendants.129 Clearly, the notion that parole board members protected only by qualified immunity would waste time and money preparing for frivolous litigation seems wildly exaggerated.
Moreover, the myth that parole board officials would waste precious days in trial is unfounded for two reasons. First, Harlow v. Fitzgerald enables defendants to dispose of frivolous claims by summary judgment.1 3 o If a plaintiff fails to show that the parole board member's actions violated a "clearly established" constitutional right, the parole board member is entitled to claim immunity from damages liability.131 At that point, involvement in litigation would cease. Sec-125. This is, of course, the subject of another Note altogether. Professor Turner offers us a window on the issue, revealing that the strain is not so much on judges as it is on law clerks. See Turner, supra note 123, at 611-12, 617-21. Furthermore, the question of whether the large number of filings, particularly prisoner filings, indicates an unjustified strain on resources is at least as empirical as it is normative. For an indication that it is not, see notes 155- ond, even if the suit survives summary judgment, extensive involvement by the parole board member herself is unlikely, given the past record of prisoner actions. In 1986 for example, of the relatively small number of prisoner suits that went to trial, nearly ninety percent consumed three days or less. 132 Furthermore, few cases have arisen in which the defendant was required to make any appearance in court. 133 Thus, the ugly threat of parole board members being dragged into the quagmire of meritless litigation appears to be chimerical.
Finally, the danger that qualified immunity would expose parole board members to financial devastation is similarly illusory. Damage awards in prisoner litigation have tended to be infrequent and small. The same five-year study of prisoner suits revealed that out of the thousands of prisoner filings made within that period, only two resulted in monetary liability: awards for six dollars and two hundred dollars. 134 An earlier study of one federal district yielded similarly meager results. Of 218 suits filed in one year, only one resulted in monetary liability: five hundred dollars for injuries sustained from beatings by prison guards. 135 In any event, it is difficult to understand why a board member, having been found to violate a clearly established constitutional right causing cognizable injury, should escape financial liability. The damages provision in section 1983 reflects that very value judgment. Thus this concern too, is born more of conjecture than of reality.136
The view that qualified immunity, exposing parole board officials to a flood of meritless "spite" suits, would result in poor decisionmaking by underqualified officials seems to have support in th~ory alone. Indeed it is disturbing that this view has enjoyed so much support in light of the easily accessible evidence to the contrary. Of course, this sort of error is neither unique nor new. Bertrand Russell warned:
If the matter is one that can be settled by observation, make the observation yourself. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. He did not do 901, 922-32 (1984) (discussing relevant factors in determining whether controlling law was clearly established at time of injury). However, this problem is unlikely to arfse in connection with parole board actions because the parameters of prisoners' rights have been clearly established in Morrissey and Greenholtz. See text at notes 4-8 supra.
132. 1986 REPORT, supra note 123, at 223 ( 136. It may be contended that the factor most relevant to parole board actions is the perceived, rather than the real, threat of monetary liability. If this contention has any weight at all, it is for arguing that parole board members should be better informed as to the real risks to which they are exposed. Risk management programs may be able to provide such information.
See text following note 146 infra.
[Vol. 87:241 so because he thought he knew. 137 Like Aristotle, the courts have relied too heavily on intuition. Had they bothered to examine the hard data, they would have quickly concluded that the prospect of prisoner litigation over parole board actions is not threatening enough to induce decisional paralysis. This is not to say, of course, that a section 1983 damages action is a toothless mechanism. In fact, allowing actions under section 1983 will improve the parole process by creating incentives for more balanced and constitutionally respectful decisionmaking.
B. Qualified Immunity and Enhanced Parole Board
Decisionmaking.
There are two reasons to believe that exposure to civil liabilitylimited as it is to violations of clearly established constitutional rights 138 -will produce more conscientious decisionmaking by parole board officials. First, the threat of suit by either a prisoner or an injured third party for malicious or reckless conduct should inspire a balanced approach to parole decisionmaking. Second, the risk of civil liability may spur efforts to train parole board officials to better respect and preserve individual rights.
Balanced Decisionmaking
Qualified immunity creates a Scylla-Charybdis system of incentives. By placing parole board officials between section 1983 suits by prisoners on the one side, and third-party victims on the other, qualified immunity motivates parole board members to steer a middle course and not engage in unconstitutional conduct. Specifically, exposing parole board members to twin liability sends two clear messages to parole board members: If members act maliciously in connection with decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole, they may have to make monetary reparation to the injured prisoner or parolee. Likewise, if they recklessly parole a highly dangerous prisoner, they run the risk of liability to a third-party victim. In such a position, parole board members are unlikely to drift toward draconian or cavalier attitudes toward prisoners and parolees.
A comparison of the expected values of each type of suit demonstrates that neither prospect is so menacing as to paralyze parole boards with indecision. On the one hand, prisoners filing section 1983 petitions in forma pauperis face several obstacles to success, including prescreening of the complaint for frivolity or malice, 139 expertise, and apathy or hostility from the bench. 140 Although these hurdles may be lowered somewhat once courts accept qualified immunity and if (a large "if" indeed) courts overcome hostility toward prisoner suits, the expected value of such suits is unlikely to be exorbitant. In the first place, prisoners tend to receive extremely modest damages awards. Because courts are aware of the inverse relationship between large damages awards and the robustness of a public official's decisionmaking, this trend is likely to continue. Second, there is little reason to believe that many prisoner suits would proceed past the receipt of a settlement offer. Prisoners are well aware of their limited legal resources and are unlikely to tum down a settlement in order to gamble at trial. Different legal obstacles should give victim's suits a similarly low value. Although a number of courts and analysts have placed a high monetary value on human life, 141 two barriers to success should discount that value. First, it is unclear whether a section 1983 action may be barred by a state survivability statute if the plaintiff has died. While the Supreme Court has held that state survival action statutes may terminate section 1983 claims when a plaintiff dies, 142 the Court has reserved judgment on whether the same applies when the plaintiff/ decedent's death results from the defendant's alleged unconstitutional conduct. 143 The causation obstacle should serve as the second discounting factor. In particular, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to characterize acts performed by a wrongfully released parolee as "state action." The Court declined to find the necessary causal connection in Martinez v. California. 144 In Martinez, a fifteen-year old girl was tortured and murdered by a parolee five months after his release from prison. The parolee, a convicted rapist, had been committed to a state mental [Vol. 87:241 '{;  hospital and thereafter sentenced for a term of one to twenty years with a recommendation that he not be paroled. Despite this warning, the parole board later released the inmate. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the action for three reasons. First, the killer was not an "agent" of the parole board. Second, there was a five-month time lapse between parole and the murder (which the Court deemed "too remote a consequence" of the defendant's actions). Finally, the defendant was not aware the decedent faced any "special danger" not shared by the public at large.14s
Thus, although third-party victim suits against parole board members create the potential for large damages awards, their expected value is discounted by difficulties in successful prosecution. Put differently, the number of successful third-party victim suits meeting the duty and causation requirements of Martinez and its progeny is unlikely to be large enough to overthrow the parole system. The parity of the threats posed by prisoner suits and third-party victim suits allows them to serve as an important moderating influence on parole boards. But while such liability will force parole board members to be more aware of the rights of prisoners and the public, the prospect of liability will not be so menacing as to induce decisional paralysis.
Incentives To Enhance Parole Board Quality
Because states may ultimately foot the bill for parole board members' liability, they may wish to reduce that risk by taking steps to 145. 444 U.S. at 285. A number of courts have used Martinez to dismiss § 1983 claims against state officials for injuries or deaths caused by parolees. For example, Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983), involved a § 1983 suit by three women who were variously raped, beaten, shot, stabbed, and set on fire by a parolee. The complaint alleged that the parole board refused to revoke parole despite knowledge that the parolee had violated his parole terms and was already suspected of an act of arson resulting in a woman's death. The court affirmed dismissal of the action on the ground that "the state agent defendants here were 'unaware that the [claimants] as distinguished from the public at large faced any special danger. ' prevent unconstitutional parole decisions from being made. Thus, the second positive result of exposure to liability via qualified immunity may be an effort to develop a better-trained body of parole board officials.
One such effort may be the introduction of public risk-management programs into parole agencies. These programs seek to identify practices vulnerable to civil exposure and to remedy them through training and supervision. 146 A number of local governments have implemented risk management programs in response to a Supreme Court decision holding that a municipality may be sued as a "person" under section 1983. 147 Features of such programs may include: (1) instruction/training of officials as to constitutional requirements; (2) establishment of an internal department for the investigation and documentation of high-risk practices; and (3) periodic review of official actions by a designated compliance officer or legal counsel. 148 In addition to increasing awareness about the constitutional implications of parole board actions, risk management programs could allay any fears that tenure on a state parole board is a ticket to financial and professional ruin.
From this analysis it becomes clear that qualified immunity for parole board members could provide the right incentives. The members themselves would have incentive to pay attention to the rights of prisoners and potential victims -the public. This dual exposure to liability would not, however, paralyze the boards, because the onus of successful prosecution would be heavy. Successful claimants would probably be rare, but their existence alone would be a positive step in curbing parole board constitutional violations. A second incentive provided by the imposition of qualified immunity would be the implementation of better risk-management techniques on the state level. Parole board members can be taught how to perform their duties within constitutional bounds. Both of these important incentives would improve the current parole board decisionmaking process immensely. But the benefits of section 1983 are not only found at the level of parole board decisionmaking. These benefits would also be apparent in the realm of simple justice -compensating those suffering the violation of their constitutional rights by parole board members. [Vol. 87:241 Ill. OVERCOMING INDIFFERENCE TO COMPENSATION UNDER  SECTION 1983 The debate over whether section 1983 damages actions are an effective deterrent or an unnecessary hindrance to state officials has been so heated that the other purpose of section 1983 -to compensate the victims of constitutional deprivations -has been ignored. However, an examination of this important aim reveals a pressing need to deny parole board members absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from civil suits.
Courts and commentators have been guilty of slighting this issue for two reasons. First, they have mistakenly assumed that a habeas corpus action provides a sufficient remedy to prisoners. Second, they have largely ignored the possibility that members of the public may suffer constitutional deprivations as a result of a parole board member's actions. This section will address these two misconceptions and direct attention to the needs -for both financial and symbolic relief -that awarding qualified immunity to parole board members can satisfy.
A. The Inadequacy of Habeas Corpus Relief
Virtually every court awarding absolute immunity to parole board members has found the existence of a habeas corpus remedy to be a decisive factor. 149 Yet careful analysis shows that this civil remedy is woefully inadequate for both prisoners and third-party victims because it is not appropriate relief for a damages claim, and cannot be used at all by third-party victims.
Prisoner Relief: Suffering from the Sins of Excess
An attempt to account for judges' reluctance to award damages to prisoners who have suffered constitutional deprivations yields no easy answer. One seemingly obvious explanation is that the courts have mistaken the safeguard value of a habeas corpus remedy, limited as it is, 150 for compensation. However, in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Preiser v. Rodriguez, that mistake is not easy to make:
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release -the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. that the reasoning of the courts of appeals is merely the product of judicial oversight.
A more plausible explanation for the denial of damages awards to prisoners is the well-documented apathy and even antipathy many federal judges hold toward prisoner litigants. Judges not only frequently complain about the growing number of section 1983 prisoner suits, 152 but they express outright hostility toward petitioners who bring them as well. 153 This hostility begins with the inference that the large number of prisoner civil rights petitions, about 20,000 in 1986, 154 means that section 1983 is being used to bring the "wrong" kind of suit. The falsity of this inference has not escaped criticism from commentators and at least one Supreme Court Justice. 155 Nevertheless, this fallacy remains because judges are prone to reinforce it with a few anecdotal examples of abuse they have heard of or witnessed. 156 Given the not-so-subtle predisposition against prisoner section 1983 suits, it is not altogether surprising to find courts slighting the issue of prisoner compensation. In parole denial cases, the court may view the monetary loss due to prolonged imprisonment as fairly negligible.157 This generalization, dubious in connection with parole release decisions, 158 is clearly inaccurate in connection with parole revocations. Wrongfully imprisoning a parolee can result in very real monetary damages such as loss of employment or business opportunities.159 In sum, the general statement that habeas corpus suits provide adequate compensation for prisoners smacks of judicial impatience [Vol. 87:241 with prisoner suits. 160 Habeas corpus actions seek a different remedy.
Victim Suits: Guilt by Association?
The granting of absolute immunity based upon the existence of an alternative habeas corpus remedy is even more bewildering when considering the opposite side of the section 1983 coin: damages suits brought by third-party victims of parolee crimes.
A writ of habeas corpus can provide no compensation (or consolation) to nonprisoners. Yet, in Nelson v. Balazic, 161 the Eighth Circuit failed to consider this self-evident truth. Instead, the court ignored the victims' plea for relief and woodenly applied precedent from earlier prisoner suits. 162 It appears that by being lumped together with the perennially unpopular prisoner litigants, third-party victims have been met with cool judicial suspicion.
In light of the compensatory purpose of section 1983, the need to permit citizens stating a cause of action to seek money damages should no longer be excluded from the immunity calculus. Compensation for the loss of life or liberty resulting from unconstitutional conduct was one of the driving forces behind the enactment of section 1983 in the first place. 163 Awarding parole board members absolute immunity can only serve to thwart that central purpose. In the relatively rare case where a third-party victim meets the heavy standard necessary to sustain a section 1983 action, 164 absolute immunity constitutes a complete and unnecessary bar to recovery.
B. The Symbolic Value of Section 1983 Compensation
Finally, requiring parole board members to answer for the constitutional injuries they inflict provides symbolic relief by vindicating the rights of civilians and prisoners alike. Section 1983 stands for the principle that state officials are not above the Constitution. 165 Subjecting parole board officials to liability for established constitutional injuries ensures the continued vitality of that principle.
This symbolic value has not gone unnoticed by at least one sitting member of the Supreme Court: "Today, section 1983 properly stands for . . . the compritment of our society to be governed by law and to protect the rights of those without power against oppression at the hands of the powerful." 166 Thus, Justice Blackmun concludes, our political system can ill afford to allow section 1983 to fade away. One commentator has gone so far as to assert that "[s]ociety ... has a right to insist that when public officials conduct themselves egregiously, they do so at their own risk."167 The need to call officials to account by imposing the threat of civil liability for their actions appears even stronger in consideration of the increased power of unelected members of state government. As increasing numbers of nonelected, nonjudicial officials acquire the ability to violate individuals' constitutional rights, there is a pressing need for society to exert at least some form of control. 168 Qualified immunity serves this need without unduly interfering with the day-to-day conduct of the officials.
However, it has been suggested that damages relief is an unnecessary method of serving that need. 169 Equitable or declaratory relief is better suited to the task, it is argued, because in cases where the affirmation of rights is most important, courts are least likely to award damages. 170
When applied to parole board actions, this argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, its premise-that " [a] litigant cares most about getting a declaration of constitutional protection when the right that he is asserting has not yet been generally acknowledged by the courts, or ... extended to the facts of his case" 171 -does not readily apply to suits against parole board members. In those cases, the opposite may be true: a person may care most about constitutional protection of well-established rights. An egregious violation of her constitutional rights seems more likely to produce more outrage, and thus a greater need for affirmation of those rights, than a "borderline" violation. Indeed, in the case of the latter, the average person may be wholly unaware that a constitutional right is implicated. 172 The second reason this argument is unpersuasive in the parole con- [Vol. 87:241 text is that it does not take the needs of victims into account. Given the symbolic value of allowing section 1983 suits against parole board members, and the inadequacy of habeas corpus relief for prisoners and victims alike, it is clear that qualified, not absolute, immunity should be given to parole board members. Courts have rarely reached this conclusion, yet an examination of the facts allows no other.
CONCLUSION
A majority of the courts considering the appropriate level of parole board member immunity have opted for absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for some, if not all, parole board actions. Although these decisions cannot be said to have been the product of careful application of the Butz test, the policy reasons behind them have an intuitive appeal: parole board officials face the unenviable task of attempting to predict the future behavior of persons hitherto deemed unfit to circulate in society. The workload is high, the plaudits few. Thus, it seems unfair to expose these officials to money damages for decisions they are required to make. It also seems inevitable that any level of civil exposure would become so burdensome that all decisionmaking would suffer.
But intuition is an unreliable method of analysis. Seemingly obvious preconceptions have the habit of withering in the stark light of reality. Qualified immunity would not expose parole board officials to liability for reasonable errors in judgment. Such judicial second-guessing would not only be burdensome, but would constitute an intrusion upon executive power. Instead, qualified immunity would only come into play in extreme cases, where the injury is the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.
Practical realities about the results of prisoner litigation also have N] ominal damages will more often have the symbolic effect of diminishing the legitimacy of the plaintiff's complaint.").
175. Whitman, supra note 124, at 52.
exposed the unreliability of intuition. , The belief that qualified immunity would mire board members in vexatious litigation -the very heart of the absolute immunity argument -is soundly contradicted by the empirical evidence. The available empirical data on prisoner litigation point unwaveringly to one conclusion: the large number of prisoner filings is deceptive because few cases advance as far as discovery. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already said as much. Even in a less hostile judicial atmosphere, relatively few claimants would prevail at trial. But the existence of the possibility of liability would be an important moderating influence on parole boards. Instead of resting on a quicksand foundation of intuition, anecdotes and stereotypes, the federal courts should build upon two firm realities. First, boards are not benches after all-the gulf between the two in terms of procedure, political accountability, background, and training is almost immeasurable. Second, section 1983 was designed to deter unconstitutional conduct by compelling state wrongdoers to compensate those they injure. 176 By grounding their analyses in reality, the courts must inevitably conclude that denying absolute, quasijudicial immunity to parole board members is neither unwarranted nor unfair. Qualified immunity will not only help raise the level of parole board conduct, but provide both compensatory and symbolic relief to victims of constitutional deprivations.
-Julio A. Thompson 176. See generally Kincy, supra note 12.
